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## THE $\epsilon\iota$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ WISHES

BY GENEVA MISENER

Three formulae for introducing wishes,  $\epsilon\iota$ ,  $\epsilon\iota\theta\epsilon$ , and  $\epsilon\iota$   $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ , are usually given in every discussion of the Greek wish-optative, but no attempt has been made to distinguish meaning or usage except in a few special treatises on particles where some explanations of the  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  in the  $\epsilon\iota$   $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  formula have been suggested. The definition of the force of the particle offered by Hoozeveen, who is one of the earliest authors of such treatises, is in part incorrect and in part inadequate;  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  causam significat optandi, vel ad praecedentem orationem pertinet: Schutz (ed. Hoog.) develops the latter part of the definition by giving some examples in which he has rightly discerned the meaning of  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ . His investigation, however, was not thorough enough to justify any general theory.

After the above-named scholars we find an entirely new method introduced by Baumlein and his adherents, who would interpret  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  in the light of the etymology ( $\gamma\epsilon$  and  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ ), and make the  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  in wish a relic of an original asseverative  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ . Thus the distinction between the wish formula with  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  and that without  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  is one of emphasis. Plausible as such an hypothesis may seem in explanation of some of the later instances of  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  in wish, more is required for its proof than the citation of a few examples where the  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  may be disregarded in translation. The logical relation of the wish sentence to the context must be analyzed and shown to be neither the causal nor derivative from the causal. For this analysis the testimony of the earlier authors should have most weight as most likely to exemplify the earliest usage of words uncorrupted by later influences. Finally, as collateral proof, indisputable evidence of the original asseverative  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  in other classes of sentences should be sought. The possibility of obtaining such evidence I have discussed in a previous paper, where I have pointed out that in the other important fields claimed for asseverative  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  traces of an original causal force can always be found. The present article will be confined to an analysis of the wish sentence alone.

As a preliminary to the discussion proper I may recall to the reader a few general facts about the character of wishes. First, as the most evident, the wish belongs to dialogue, i. e., to colloquial speech, and is subject to the various influences operative in this field. By its very nature, moreover, it is likely to be occasioned by deep feeling and to be couched in emotional language which tends to omit links in reasoning and leave them to be suggested by the tone and import of the thought articulately expressed. Finally, we must remember that the motive of the wish clause is not always to declare an actual desire, but as often to attest a feeling or attitude bearing on the preceding or following thought.

In analyzing wishes in Homer, where the majority of the instances occur, an initial difficulty is encountered in distinguishing the conditional wish sentences from the stereotyped conditions. The *εἰ γάρ* sentences with the past indicative are the most perplexing. Ameis, who has treated the question at some length in his edition of Homer, would make them conditional wishes because he believes that in no other way can the *γάρ* be explained. Such a solution begs the question. Whether the sentence be considered a wish plus a conclusion, or a conditional protasis and apodosis, the *γάρ* in either case must be explained in the same way, since it introduces the whole sentence and not the *εἰ* clause. In this paper, then, I shall include all *εἰ γάρ*'s that might in any way be classified as wishes, disregarding the question of their grammatical relation to their conclusion or apodosis, whichever it may be called.

The purely causal and explanatory meanings of *γάρ* are naturally not found in wishes, as emotional speech is not given to formal reasoning, and the wish which is of an attesting or asseverative character is more suited to confirming or motivating some expression of feeling—approval, objection, or the like. Moreover, in this subtle sphere of the emotions, we may expect great variety of logical relations passing from the direct and evident to the elusive and vaguely suggested.

Among the more easily discerned are the confirming *εἰ γάρ* sentences in which an assertion—promise or threat it may be—

is supported by a wish that something dear to the heart of the speaker, though often unrealizable, might as surely happen, e. g. *Il.* xviii. 464. *θάρσει·*

μή τοι ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆσι μελόντων.  
αἶ γάρ μιν θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ὦδε δυναίμην  
νόσφιν ἀποκρύψαι, ὅτε μιν μόρος αἰνὸς ἱκάνοι,  
ὥς οἱ τεύχεα καλὰ παρέσσεται, οἷά τις αὐτε  
ἀνθρώπων πολέων θαυμάσσεται, ὅς κεν ἴδῃται.<sup>1</sup>

*γάρ* does not introduce the wish idea alone; in fact, the wish is subordinate in thought to the clause *ὥς οἱ . . . . . παρέσσεται*. Hephaestus has in mind, not the fulfilment of his wish, for which he cannot hope, but the confirming of his encouraging words to Thetis by assuring her that he wishes he might be as certain of rescuing Achilles from death as he is of the forthcoming of the arms.

An *ἐπεὶ* clause serves a like purpose in Demosth. xix. 172:

ἰδία δ', ἐξομοσάμενον, οὐτ' αὖ καλὸν οὐτ' ἀσφαλὲς ἦν ἐκείσε πλανᾶσθαι. ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ τούτους βούλεσθαι σῶσαι, ἐξώλης ἀπολοίμην καὶ προώλης εἰ προσλαβὼν γ' ἂν ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ, μετὰ τούτων ἐπρέσβευσα. Since except for wishing to save these, may I perish utterly if I would have taken any amount of money and gone on the embassy with them.

The logical bond is not always, it must be admitted, so distinct in wishes at the beginning of a speech—a tendency shown also in questions and other forms of sentences in the same position. In such instances the attitude toward the speaker<sup>2</sup> preceding must frequently be inferred from an exclamation of scorn or surprise, or even less directly from the tone of the *γάρ* clause itself. The former is illustrated in *Il.* xiii. 825, where Hector answers the taunts and threats of Ajax by an exclamation of disbelief and scorn which he proceeds to substantiate by the *γάρ* clause: *Αἶαν ἄμαρτοεπές, βουγαίε, ποῖον ξείπες· | εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼν οὕτω γε Διὸς παῖς αἰγίοχοιο | εἶπν' ἥματα πάντα . . . ὥς νῦν ἡμέρῃ ἦδε κακὸν φέρει Ἀργείοισιν . . .*<sup>3</sup> The thought is practically this: "Ajax, you

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Od.* xv. 156 (a promise), xviii. 235 (assertion), xxi. 372 (assertion); *Il.* xxii. 346 (resolve), viii. 538 (prediction). *Od.* iii. 218 confirms the hope suggested in the question by a real wish with a *ὥς* clause containing the important thought, as is shown by the speech of Telemachus and Athena's answer which follow. When the wish is repeated, l. 223, it is introduced by a simple *εἰ*, proving that the *γάρ* belongs to the whole period and not to the first wish alone.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Meaning of γάρ*, p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Od.* ix. 523, xvii. 251.

are talking idly, for we (and not you) shall surely (I wish I might be as certainly the son of Zeus) conquer today."

The wish in all these instances is not complete without the determinative clause with *ὥς*. *γάρ* introduces not the wish alone but the whole sentence, which is purely asseverative. The nature of the reply in *Od.* ix. 523 is indicated only by the content of the wish sentence, but the *γάρ* clause has the same function as in the above (520): *αὐτὸς δ' αἰ κ' ἐθέλῃσι, ἰήσεται, οὐδέ τις ἄλλος | . . . Ὡς ἔφατ', αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον, | αἶ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰδωνός σε δυναίμην | εἴνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἀϊδος εἴσω | ὥς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ' ἰήσεται οὐδ' Ἐνοσίχθων.*<sup>1</sup> A rough translation would be, "Nay, not so, for surely (I would I could as surely send you to Hades) not even Poseidon will heal your eye." The weight of the confirmation here rests on the conclusion, while the *γάρ* clause merely emphasizes the certainty of the speaker. The process is, however, at times reversed. The wish may bear the more important part in confirming, and the conclusion which may follow or not, strengthen the wish by deducing the results therefrom. Although the two clauses are not as closely connected as in the former cases, they are, still, both logically introduced by the *γάρ*. E. g. *Il.* ii. 371: *τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων. | "ῆ μὰν αὐτ' ἀγορῇ νικᾷς, γέρον, υἷας Ἀχαιῶν. | αἶ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἀπολλών, | τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες εἶεν Ἀχαιῶν, | τῷ κε τάχ' ἡμύσειε πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος . . .* Agamemnon assures Nestor of the sincerity of his praise thus: "For I would I might have ten like you; then would Troy surely fall."

As in the other confirmatory wishes, it is not always necessary that the assent be given in so many words, for the wish is in itself an indisputable indication of the attitude which it confirms. Odysseus, for instance, in *Od.* xxi. 200, needs no other assurance of the loyalty which he asks of Eumaeus than the wish of the swineherd that Odysseus might return and give him an opportunity to prove himself: *Ζεῦ πάτερ, αἶ γὰρ τοῦτο τελευτήσῃας ἐέλδωρ, | ὥς ἔλθοι μὲν κείνος ἀνὴρ, ἀγάγοι δέ ἐ δαίμων. | γνοίης χ' οἷη ἐμῇ δύναμις καὶ χεῖρες ἔπονται.*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Od.* xxi. 402.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Od.* xv. 545 (assent), viii. 333 (assent), xix. 22, xxiv. 376, xx. 169, xviii. 366; Aesch. *Prom.* 152; Xen. *Cyr.* xi. 1. 38.

This use of γάρ in confirming direct assent is extended to replies where there is only approval or acceptance of a previous speaker's prediction or assertion, e. g. *Od.* xvii. 496. Penelope (494) says, "Αἰθ' οὕτως αὐτόν σε βάλοι κλυτότοξος Ἀπόλλων, and Eurynome answers: τὴν δ' αὖτ' Εὐρυνόμη ταμὴν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν· | Εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρῆσιν τέλος ἡμετέρῃσι γένοιτο· | οὐκ ἄν τις τούτων γε εὐθρονον ᾗῳ ἴκοιτο. A comparison of the wish<sup>1</sup> of the house-keeper (496) with that of Penelope (494) which is introduced by αἰθ' proves without doubt that the distinction made in the formulae results from the difference in the relations which the wishes bear to the preceding narrative. The first is a simple wish devoutly desired, an outburst of indignation at what she has seen, not an answer to a previous speech. The second is a conditional wish clause expressing, through the wish and its conclusion, an assurance of the speaker's sympathy with the words of Penelope.

In regard to a similar wish with γάρ in Herodotus i. 27, Broschman (p. 9) remarks that, although Herodotus did not think of the origin of the formula, a causal relation can still be traced for the γάρ—to quote—quamquam si plena esset oratio et ante optationem comprobandi vel exsultandi notionem quandam exspectaremus ad quam γάρ referretur, et post optationem quae deest apodosisin.

The passage in question is: Κροῖσον δὲ ἐλπίσαντα λέγειν ἐκείνον ἀληθέα εἰπεῖν· Αἰ γὰρ τοῦτο θεοὶ ποιήσειαν ἐπὶ νοῦν νησιώτησι, ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Λυδῶν παῖδας σὺν ἵπποισι. The wish clause confirms Croesus' approval of the good news brought by the other speaker, whether we believe that this feeling was betrayed by a gesture or look, or was simply to be inferred from the tone of the γάρ sentence. That Herodotus did not use the γάρ with a consciousness of its evident force cannot be taken for granted until instances of a similar wish without γάρ have been found, proving that αἰ γάρ, αἰθε, and αἰ were interchangeable formulae at that time. The retention of the γάρ force in writers following Herodotus<sup>2</sup> lends probability to the opposite theory, since as soon as the meaning

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Od.* xvii. 513, xx. 236.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Arist. *Peace* 346; Eur. *Elect.* 663, *Ion.* 410, *Orest.* 1209, *Suppl.* 1145. The γάρ in the wish Pindar *Pyth.* i. 46 is a narrative γάρ introducing the praise which Pindar stated he is about to give. It cannot then be counted as an instance of the wish formula.

of *εἰ γάρ* became indistinguishable from the simple *εἰ*, as was its tendency later in replies, the latter formula supplanted the former.

It may be well at this point to call attention to the infrequency of *γάρ* in wishes after Homer, although the apparent decrease is in part due to a difference in interpretation resulting from the further development of the *εἰ* clause. All the conditions<sup>1</sup> which still have in Homer the wish form became in classical Greek clearly recognized conditions, and the *εἰ γάρ* can consequently be no longer claimed as wish formula. There is, however, a real decline in the use, and the reason is to be found in the vagueness of the *γάρ* in the wish formulae of assent and approval and their opposites, where the *εἰ* clause performed its function almost as completely without the *γάρ* as with. The subtle link of reasoning indicated by *γάρ* was more and more disregarded until the simple form almost completely supplanted the fuller. This last stage is not reached until late in classical times, although instances occur even in Homer where the two forms of replies are so similar in content that the force of the *γάρ* might be easily overlooked. E. g., *Od.* xix. 309: αἶ γὰρ τοῦτο, ξεῖνε, ἔπος τετελεσμένον εἴη· | τῷ κε τάχα γνοίης φιλότῆτά τε πολλά τε δῶρα . . . <sup>2</sup> and *Od.* vii. 331: εὐχόμενος δ' ἄρα εἶπεν ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' . . . Ζεῦ πάτερ, αἰθ' ὅσα εἶπε τελευτήσκειν ἅπαντα | Ἀλκίνοος· τοῦ μὲν κεν ἐπὶ ζειδωρον ἄρουραν | ἄσβεστον κλέος εἴη, ἐγὼ δέ κε πατρίδ' ἰκοίμην. In the first Penelope confirms her gratitude—expressed probably by gesture or tone—for the kindly intention of the stranger in predicting Odysseus' return by wishing that his words may come true, which she, however, doubts, and by promising the stranger a reward if this should be the outcome. In the second the thought uppermost is that of independent prayer, as is shown by the formal invocation and by *εὐχόμενος*. It is inspired by and in accord with what Alcinoos said, but its primary purpose is to reveal Odysseus' eagerness for the fulfilment of the promise of the king. Up to this point only confirmative wish sentences have been discussed; but there is no lack of evidence of the conscious use of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Eur. Alc.* 91, 1072; *Theocrit.* xvi. 82; *Eur. Rhés.* 464.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Od.* xv. 536, xx. 236, xvii. 163; *Eur. Cyclops.* 261 ἐγώ; *κακῶς γὰρ ἐξόλοιο* must be classified with the confirming wishes, though different from the preceding examples where the feeling is favorable. Here the imprecation substantiates the indignation voiced in the ἐγώ, by a more emphatic expression of it.

γάρ in wishes, as in other forms of sentences, to motivate, also, or to justify, a feeling or an attitude. E. g.,<sup>1</sup> *Il.* vii. 132 (124): (124) ὦ πόποι, ἦ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιῖδα γαῖαν ἰκάνει, | ἦ κε μέγ' οἰμώξειε γέρων . . . . (129) εἰ πτώσσοντας ὑφ' Ἑκτορι πάντας ἀκούσαι | . . . . αἱ γὰρ Ζεῦ . . . . ἡβῶμ' ὥς ὅτ' . . . . (157) εἴθ' ὥς ἡβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη· | τῷ κε τάχ' ἀντήσειε μάχης κοριθαίολος Ἑκτωρ.<sup>2</sup> The train of reasoning might be thus expressed: "Verily, you are disgracing Greece by thus crouching before Hector (and I rightly censure you, i. e., I am not censuring you for not fighting, while I myself at the same time would not fight), for would that I might be (or, if I might only be) as young and strong as I was once, then would Hector not lack an opponent." γάρ introduces the whole series of sentences and includes the resumption of the wish, l. 157, where the speaker consequently uses only εἴθ', and not εἰ γάρ, as in the first.

The absence of γάρ in a conditional wish of like content, *Od.* xiv. 468, can be readily explained: ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέκραγον, οὐκ ἐπικεύσω | εἴθ' ὥς ἡβώοιμι βίη τε μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη | ὥς ὅθ' ὑπὸ Τροίην . . . . (No conclusion follows.) Unlike the wish introduced by εἰ γάρ, it is without any close logical or grammatical connection with the previous words, but is a simple exclamation not developed beyond the bare expression of the feigned wish that serves by analogy to convey a hint to the hearers of that which is really desired. Hayman<sup>3</sup> says a suppressed apodosis may be supplied as easily here as in *Od.* xix. 22 or *Od.* xx. 169, where εἰ γάρ is read. But it is not on this basis that the distinction between the two formulae must be drawn. γάρ is a causal particle which shows the relation between main clauses and is not concerned with the connection between the main sentence to which it belongs and subordinate clauses.

In motivating by anticipation a following sentence, a somewhat unusual use of the wish with γάρ developed in Homer, γάρ paves the way for an objection to a previous speaker's suggestion, or for

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Meaning of γάρ*, pp. 18, 31, 43.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Il.* xvi. 722 without γάρ where the content of the wish clause is similar, but there is no strong feeling expressed for the wish to motivate. Cf. also *Od.* xvi. 99; *Il.* xvii. 156, *Od.* iv. 732; Aesch. *Choeph.* 345 (justification of grief), *Suppl.* 867; *Od.* xvi. 148 (justification of refusal to follow the suggestion of another—a conditional wish).

<sup>3</sup> Edit. of *Od.*



the disappointment of the wishes or expectations of the hearers, by introducing an assurance of good wishes and sympathy for those whose hopes are to be disappointed, e. g., *Od.* iii. 205: καὶ λίην κείνος μὲν ἐτίσατο . . . αἱ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοσσήνδε θεοὶ δύναμιν περιθεῖεν | τίσασθαι μνηστήρας . . . ἀλλ' οὐ μοι τοιοῦτον ἐπέκλωσαν θεοὶ ὄλβον.<sup>1</sup> Telemachus assents to Nestor's praise of Orestes, but distrusts his ability to follow Orestes' example. Before, however, he rejects Nestor's advice he apologizes for his seeming inertia by assuring him that there is no lack of desire on his part if the gods would but grant him the power. An ἐπεὶ wish clause, *Plat. Prot.* 335 C, performs the same function as the γάρ wish above, but follows, instead of preceding, the objection: ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τι εἶναι. The readiness of will expressed in the ἐπεὶ clause softens the refusal and, at the same time, moderates the use of the word ἀδύνατος. A still nearer parallel to the ἐπεὶ sentence is found in another wish, *Arist. Eccles.* 380, where the thought is virtually equivalent to ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν . . . ΒΔΕ. τὸ τριώβολον δῆτ' ἔλαβες; ΧΡΕ. εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον· ἀλλ' ὕστερος νῦν ἦλθον, ὥστ' αἰσχύνομαι . . . . The ἀλλά that usually accompanies the γάρ points to a close relation in function to the ἀλλὰ γάρ introducing objections in other forms of sentences.<sup>2</sup>

This apologetic use of γάρ throws some light on an obscure γάρ in *Aesch. Agam.* 217: τί τῶν δ' ἄνευ κακῶν; | πῶς λιπόνανς γένωμαι | συμμαχίας ἀμαρτῶν; | πανσανέμου γὰρ θυσίας | παρθενίου θ' αἵματος ὄρ | γὰρ περιοργῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν | θέμις· εὖ γὰρ εἶη. The wish is at once a modification and justification of the reluctant acquiescence indicated by the clause ending with θέμις. It is this last word which inspires the εὖ. Agamemnon cannot quite convince himself that the sacrifice is θέμις, but his hope that it may be for the best prompts him to utter the wish justifying the virtual consent which he had given. The consequences will vindicate the deed. As the other instances quoted above apologize for an objection, this may be said to apologize for acquiescence.

BERLIN, October 25, 1907

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Od.* iv. 197; *Il.* iv. 189, x. 536, xiii. 485, xvii. 561, xxii. 454; *Arist. Eccles.* 380; *Plato Crito* 44 D, *Rep.* 432 C.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Meaning of γάρ*, p. 66.